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A B S T R A C T
Introduction: Triage is an important aspect of the management of mass casualty incidents. This study
describes the triage after the Turkish Airlines Crash near Amsterdam in 2009. The results of the triage and
the injuries of P3 casualties were evaluated. In addition, the role of the trauma mechanism and its effect
on spinal immobilisation during transport was analysed.
Methods: Retrospective analysis of investigational reports, ambulance forms, and medical charts of
survivors of the crash. Outcomes were triage classiﬁcation, type of injury, AIS, ISS, emergency
interventions and the spinal immobilisation during transport.
Results: A minimal documentation of prehospital triage was found, and no exact numbers could be
recollected. During inhospital triage 28% was triaged as P1, 10% had an ISS  16 and 3% met the modiﬁed
Baxt criteria for emergency intervention. 40% was triaged P3, 72% had an ISS  8 and 63% was discharged
from the Emergency Department after evaluation. In hospital over-triage was up to 89%. Critical
mortality rate was 0%. Nine per cent of P3 casualties and 17% of ‘walking’ casualties had serious injuries.
Twenty-two per cent of all casualties was transported with spinal immobilisation. Of the casualties
diagnosed with spinal injury 22% was not transported with spinal immobilisation.
Conclusion: After the Turkish Airlines Crash documentation of prehospital triage was minimal.
According to the Baxt criteria the overtriage was high. Injuries sustained by plane crash survivors that
seem minimally harmed must not be underestimated. Considering the high energy trauma mechanism,
too little consideration was given to spinal immobilisation during transport.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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In a disaster or mass casualty incident (MCI), a rapid assessment
and treatment of the injured is important. On February 25, 2009 a
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casualties needed triage. Emergency Services in the Netherlands
have experience with MCIs, e.g. 245 casualties in the Volendam
cafe´ ﬁre in 2001 and 944 casualties in the Enschede ﬁreworks
explosion in 2000.1–3 In previous MCIs difﬁculties with triage
occurred like pre-hospital services employing different or inade-
quate triage methods 2–7, pp. 50–52. At the Volendam cafe´ ﬁre few
triage scores were documented at the scene of the accident: the
prehospital triage of the burns casualties was inadequate and did
not lead to treatment and transport priorities.2,3
The triage of trauma casualties is meant to allocate casualties to
the appropriate hospital, bearing in mind reducing mortality and
morbidity of individual casualties and secondly cost effective-
ness.8,9 In the everyday situation there is no need to attend to the
‘greatest good to the greatest number of people.’ A difference with
triage during disasters and large MCIs is that medical capacity is
limited, resulting in a need for lower over-triage rates in order to
P1 (red): Immedi ate/ Critical: ABCD unstable, in need of immediate treatment because of either: A (airway),  no 
open  airway; B (breathing), respiratory rate < 10 or >3 0; C (circulation), pulse rate >1 20; D (disability)  GCS 
(Glasgow Co ma Score)  <8. 
P2 (yellow): Urgent/ Severe: AB CD stable, but with possible life-threateni ng injuries if  not treated within 6 hours.
P3 (gre en): Delayed/ Mi nor : AB CD stable, walking wounded.
Fig. 1. Triage Sieve classiﬁcation according to MIMMS.
Fig. 2. The scene of the accident.
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blasts the critical mortality rate (number of critically injured
casualties that died on the way to, or in hospital) has proven to be
directly related to overtriage.10,12,13
The Triage Sieve and Sort Algorithm is a component of the Major
Incident Medical Management and Support (MIMMS) course based
on physiological parameters like ability to walk, airway patency,
breathing rate and pulse rate and was (and is still) the current
practice in MCIs in the Netherlands during the Turkish Airlines
Crash (TAC) in 2009 (Fig. 1).14,15, p. 53
The guidelines for ﬁeld triage by the American College of
Surgeons describe mechanisms of injury that might indicate a high
energy impact, and casualties of such an injury mechanism should
be transported to a trauma centre for Advanced Trauma Life
Support (ATLS1) resuscitation and subsequent treatment of their
injuries.8,9 As an airplane crash deviates from regular trauma
mechanisms, medical personnel might not be familiar with
expected injuries in casualties of an airplane crash.
In this study several triage-related issues after the TAC are
evaluated. The research questions were:
(1) Triage process:
a. What were the results of the prehospital and inhospital
triage process of the casualties of the TAC crash?
b. How did triage classiﬁcations relate to clinical outcomes?
(2) P3 and walking wounded:
a. What were the injuries of the P3 casualties and ‘walking’
casualties?
b. What was the expected severity of their injuries?
(3) Mechanism of injury and spinal immobilisation:
a. Did trauma mechanism play part in this mass casualty
triage?
b. How did this effect spinal immobilisation rate during
transport?
This retrospective study has been approved by the Institutional
Review Board of the Academic Medical Centre Amsterdam.
Setting
Turkish Airlines ﬂight TK1951 crashed at 10:26 am in a ﬁeld
1.5 km before the runway of Schiphol international airport, near
Amsterdam (Fig. 2). Nine people did not survive the impact of the
crash. Casualties were transported to a total of 14 hospitals ranging
from 5.8 to 53.5 km from the crash site. The majority (86%) was
transported to a hospital within a 25 km distance.16
Methods
A retrospective analysis was performed of available ambulance
forms, the registered information of the 3 deployed HelicopterEmergency Medical Service (HEMS) teams and the present triage
cards of the casualties. We also used the collected data of the
events as described in investigational reports of the Dutch Health
Inspectorate and Dutch Safety Board.17–19
The prehospital data collected were: gender, age, vital signs and
revised trauma score (RTS), triage classiﬁcation, use of triage cards,
time of transport and arrival at Emergency Department and
medical interventions.
Inhospital data included: trauma level of the receiving hospital,
inhospital triage classiﬁcation, documented injuries, Abbreviated
Injury Scale (AIS), Injury Severity Score (ISS) and medical
procedures. The inhospital triage classiﬁcation reported in the
investigational reports of the Dutch Health Inspectorate and Dutch
Safety Board was utilised for our study purposes. These data were
not documented per individual casualty but only as a group and
therefore no comparison with individual diagnosis or ISS was
possible. The data consisted of estimations reported during
evaluation interviews by the hospitals involved and crosschecked
with the collection of individual injuries and ISS scores in our own
database.
An indicator of the performance of triage is the critical mortality
rate, representing the number of critical casualties (P1) that died
on the way to or in the hospital.4,10,12,20
Triage classiﬁcation
We compared the triage classiﬁcations with 2 clinical out-
comes; Injury Severity Score (ISS) and the modiﬁed Baxt criteria.21–
23 For the comparison with ISS we analysed how the P1 category
correlated with an ISS  16, P2 with an ISS 9–15, and P3 with an
ISS  8. Second, we used the modiﬁed Baxt criteria (from now on
Fig. 3. Modiﬁed Baxt criteria.
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Baxt criteria consist of emergency interventions patients have
undergone in order to treat acute life threatening injuries. Patients
who met the Baxt criteria are considered P1. Patients who did not
meet Baxt criteria but were admitted to hospital for at least 24 h
were considered P2. Patients that did not meet Baxt criteria and
were discharged within 24 h are considered P3.21–23
We evaluated the processes of triage and different outcomes
from prehospital and inhospital triage. Overtriage was calculated
by dividing the number of noncritical casualties triaged as P1, by
the total number of P1 triaged casualties.12,20,22 Undertriage was
calculated as the ratio of critically injured casualties, and casualties
with an ISS  16 that were not transported to a level one trauma
centre.9,24
Pre-hospital P3 and ‘walking’ casualties
Casualties triaged as P3 (delayed) were determined by either a
documented P3 triage classiﬁcation on the ambulance form or on
the triage tag. Another subgroup of P3 casualties was determined
by documentation of their presence in the last casualty clearing
station. In this casualty clearing station casualties triaged P3 were
initially gathered in order to be reunited with their families. Later it
was decided that these casualties also needed inhospital evalua-
tion because of the high energy trauma mechanism.17,19 Duplicates
within both groups were ﬁltered out and the subgroups were
analysed together as one. Of this group we analysed the injuries
and treatment.
In the Triage Sieve algorithm the ﬁrst determination is done by
noting whether the casualty is walking.15 When walking,
casualties are triaged as either P3 (if injured) or uninjured. We
identiﬁed casualties that were reported (by documentation on
ambulance form) to have come ‘walking’ from the aircraft
wreckage or crash site. We also made calculations for these
groups (P3 and walking wounded) combined (taken out dupli-
cates) in order to study the underestimation of the injuries of this
category. To be able to see if the frequently used triage term
‘walking wounded’ is accurate in excluding major injuries we
analysed their injuries and treatments (operative or non-opera-
tive).
In order to report the extent of the injuries and possible need for
hospital evaluation, we determined the highest AIS score of each of
the P3 casualties and each of the walking wounded.
Trauma mechanism and spinal immobilisation
During the triage process all casualties were eventually
considered to have been subjected to a high energy trauma
mechanism. We gathered documentation of spinal immobilisationduring transport on the ambulance forms and diagnosis of spinal
injury and the inhospital treatment.
The data were collected, stored and analysed using SPSS1 16.0
(SPSS1 for Windows1 version 16.0, IBM1 corporation, U.S.A.).
Results
Events
A house and 2 barns next to the crash site functioned as
improvised casualty clearing stations (CCS). It was reported that in
the house about 20 of the most severely injured casualties were
gathered (in the investigational reports called P1), and in the 2
barns about 70–75 of the less severely and minimally injured (in
the investigational reports referred to as P2 and P3).17,19 Some
casualties were trapped in de wreckage. At least 37 minimally
injured casualties (in the investigational reports referred to as P3)
were later transported to a third CCS in a sports centre, which was
the pre-assigned CCS in the MCI protocols. This CCS is supposed to
be mainly for P3 casualties. Here during retriage, 2 casualties were
found to be severely injured (P1) and 17 to have major injuries (P2).
Then it was decided by that all casualties suffered a high energy
trauma and therefore all casualties should be evaluated in hospital
according to ATLS1 principles.
Two casualties left the crash site by themselves and were not
triaged but reported to a hospital later that day and the day after
the crash. They are not accounted for in the results. The other 124
occupants were transported to 14 different hospitals within a
median time of 3.5 h after the crash. We retrieved ambulance
forms of 91 patients, which contained heterogeneous and
incomplete data.
In this article the crash site, the house and two barns, which
were the ﬁrst improvised CCS, together are referred to as ‘the scene
of the accident.’ The third CCS, being the pre-assigned sports
centre, is referred to as the CCS. The means of transport are
summarised in Fig. 4.
Triage classiﬁcation
We found documentation of a prehospital triage classiﬁcation
on 27 of the 91 ambulance forms (30%, 2 P2 and 25 P3). Few triage
tags were used and only 11 were retrieved.17,19
The result of the triage classiﬁcation, ISS and Baxt criteria are
shown in Table 1. It was reported from the scene that there were
20 P1 casualties.17,19 When considering an ISS  16 as a measure
of P1 casualties, 7 (35%) of those 20 casualties should not




Results of P3 and ‘walking’ casualties.
P3 and walking (n = 50)
Mean ISS (median; IQR; range) 4.1 (2; IQR 1/5; 0–22)
Hospitalised 17 (34%)
Mean no. of days in hospital (median; IQR; range) 7 days (3; 2/10; 1–17)
Fracture 11 (22%)
Spinal fracture 7 (14%)
Surgery 7 (14%)
Surgery for spinal fracture 5
At least 1 moderate injury (AIS  2) 22 (44%)
At least 1 serious injury (AIS  3) 6 (12%)
Table 3
Transportation to 1st receiving hospital.
Spinal injury No spinal injury Total
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and 89% with the Baxt criteria. All casualties were evaluated in a
hospital, and all casualties who needed emergency intervention
(Baxt criteria) were transported to a level 1 trauma centre. Eighty-
nine per cent of the casualties with inhospital P1 triage and 92% of
casualties with ISS 16 were transported to a level 1 trauma
centre, giving an undertriage rate of 11% and 8% respectively.
No casualties died on the way to or in hospital; therefore the
critical mortality rate was 0%.
P3 and walking wounded
We identiﬁed 34 casualties as P3 either by documentation on
their ambulance form or because they went through the CCS.
Among those are several victims that were later re-triaged as P2 or
P1, because of existing injury, not because of clinical deterioration
(information by word of mouth). We could not identify those
casualties that were upgraded in triage classiﬁcation. One P3
patient was later diagnosed with a bilateral lung contusion, a
spinal fracture, and an ankle fracture, resulting in an ISS of 22.
On the ambulance forms of 23 casualties it was reported that
they came walking from the wreckage by themselves. One
‘walking’ casualty was diagnosed with a tibia fracture, 2 spinal
fractures, and a kidney contusion (ISS 17).
Combing these two groups and extracting duplicates we
identiﬁed 50 casualties within this category. The results of clinical
outcomes in this category are in Table 2. The injuries diagnosed in
this group with an AIS  3 were a fracture of the odontoid of the
2nd cervical vertebra, 5 thoracolumbar spine fractures (in 3
casualties), a fracture of the sternum, 2 tibia fractures (bilateral in 1
patient), 2 cerebral contusions and one retina lacerations.
Spinal immobilisation
Documentation on transport with or without spinal immobi-
lisation was found for 83 casualties. It can be assumed (and wasTable 1
Triage disposition according to location and injury criteria.
P1 P2 P3 Total
Prehospital triagea Unknown 2 34 124
Inhospital triage 35 (28%) 40 (32%) 49 (40%) 124
ISS 13 (10%) 22 (18%) 89 (72%) 124
Baxt (see also Fig. 3) 4 (3%) 42 (34%) 78 (63%) 124
a From the prehospital triage documentation of only 36 victims (2 P2, 34 P3) was
found.reported verbally to the authors) that the 17 patients transported
together in a bus had no spinal immobilisation. Of the 126
survivors, 23 had a spinal injury, 4 of whom we determined
received no immobilisation on transport. Ten patients needed
surgical treatment for their spinal injury of whom 1 was not
immobilised during initial transport. The data on spinal immobi-
lisation during transport are shown in Table 3.
Two (6%) of the P3 casualties were later diagnosed with spinal
injury, but were not immobilised during transport. Separate from
these 2 there were also 2 (9%) of the ‘walking’ casualties with a
spinal fracture that were not immobilised. One of them needed
operative treatment for the spinal injury.
Discussion
Before the discussion of the individual topics is started it must be
noted that this paper is in no way intended to criticise the individual
work of the emergency responders who all contributed to savingFull immobilisation 11 (61%) 7 (9%) 18 (17%)
Only spine board 3 (17%) (no
C-spine collar)
3 (4%) 6 (6%)
Only collar 0 1 (1%) 1 (1%)
No immobilisation 4 (22%) 54 (83%) 58 + 17a (75%)
Total 18b 65 100a
N = 100; no of casualties with documentation about spinal immobilisation.
a We assume that the 17 patients transferred together in a casualty bus were
without spinal immobilisation.
b Excluding 5 patients with unknown immobilisation.
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performed mostly by hospital professionals and might therefore
insufﬁciently capture the complexity of prehospital workﬂow.
Triage
The evaluation of the triage process after the TAC was difﬁcult
because there was a small amount of individualised data on
prehospital and inhospital triage. It is remarkable how little triage
tags were used, namely in 12% of casualties of whom we found
prehospital data. Evaluations of other MCIs around the world have
shown the same.25,26 The National Protocol Ambulance Care does
prescribe the use of casualty/triage tags15, p. 20. There has been
criticism on the layout of triage tags themselves and also on the
fact that ambulance personnel are unfamiliar with the use in daily
practice. In the management of an MCI, deviation from daily
routine has shown to be difﬁcult. 19,25 This has been mentioned as
an explanation why the tags were not used in the TAC. In the TAC
‘only’ 126 casualties needed evaluation. In larger incidents, with
greater amounts of casualties (e.g. Madrid bombing 2004 with
more than 2000 casualties) practical sorting methods of triaged
casualties are indispensable. Some plead for geographical triage
instead of using triage tags, because in MCIs with >20–25
casualties triage tags could be impractical.26 In a way this was
done at the TAC for most of the P3 casualties who were transferred
to a separate CCS. The use of triage tags and feasibility of
implementation in daily practice should be investigated. This asks
for a casualty/triage tag with enough space for identiﬁcation
information, medical information and triage category which can be
altered during the process. The goal should be to create a tag/card
(maybe digital) that has use during day to day casualty
management and is also applicable in MCIs.
In the research of the TAC we focused on the possible overtriage
of P1 casualties and the possible underestimation of the injuries of
P3 casualties. In an MCI where there is no shortage of medical care,
non-life threatening injuries have a greater importance than in
disasters, especially in developed countries with high standards of
medical care.
Overtriage was not deﬁned by the level of trauma centre where
casualties were transported to, because ambulance personnel
could have chosen to transport casualties with minor or moderate
injuries to a level 1 trauma centre because of their large capacity
rather than because of the specialised care.9,27 Because all
casualties were eventually evaluated in a hospital no undertriage
was present in that way. Therefore we evaluated undertriage to
standards of daily practice, not MCIs, which determines whether
critically injured casualties are transported to the highest level of
care in the region.9 Overtriage rates are high (80–89%) when
considering the Baxt criteria, but when using the ISS as a measure
the rates were lower (35–63%). However, an ISS  16 can consist of
all none (acutely) life-threatening injuries and ISS should not be
used as a sole mean to deﬁne critically injured casualties as in the
P1 triage classiﬁcation.21,22
In daily practice a certain amount of overtriage is accepted to
diminish under triage. It has been stated that in MCIs and disasters
an overtriage rate of 50% must be accepted to diminish undertriage
to zero.12 However, the American College Surgeons states that in
daily practice an undertriage of 5% is acceptable with an associated
overtriage rate of 25–50%.9,28 The overtriage rate of P1 casualties in
TAC of up to 89% is high, as was the undertriage rate of P1casualties
of up to 12%. This was not reﬂected in the critical mortality rate
(0%), which could be due to the large availability of medical
resources in this setting.29 In descriptions of other MCI the
undertriage rates are mostly not evaluated. Our 12% undertriage is
calculated from a daily practice standard, and can be considered
low for a MCI.The high inhospital overtriage rates could be due to inaccurate
use of the P1 triage classiﬁcation. In an evaluation report a major
trauma centre mentions to, at a certain time have received ‘5 P1
casualties of whom 2 had acute life threatening injuries.’30
According to the MIMMS Triage Sieve, the 3 casualties without
acute life threatening injuries should not have been triaged P1.
P3 and ‘walking’ casualties
In the TAC medical management it appears to have been unclear
how to manage casualties triaged as P3, as 37 P3 casualties were
almost sent home, but were later assigned entitlement to
inhospital evaluation. In the patient distribution plan of the region
it is stated that ‘inhospital treatment only applies to major injuries
(P1 and P2).’ ‘Casualties with less serious injuries (P3) are only
taken in account as a hindrance at the scene of the accident and at
the hospital entrance.’ 31,32 The investigational report of the Dutch
Health Care Inspectorate mentions that ‘P3 casualties can be
treated at the scene by medical assistance teams.’ 17 In our opinion,
this is an incorrect interpretation of the MIMMS triage method,
which determines that P3 casualties have no transport priority and
need not necessarily be transported by ambulance initially.
MIMMS does not advocate that inhospital evaluation of P3
casualties should be withheld.14
Our data show that casualties from an airplane crash who are
walking and/or triaged as P3 can still have major injuries, including
spinal fractures. Some casualties might not immediately experi-
ence the physical pain caused by these injuries because of high
levels of stress hormones released directly after the survival of
such an accident. Repeated evaluation of casualties (retriage), as
was done in the CCS, is therefore necessary.
If all P3 and walking wounded in the TAC had not been
evaluated in hospital an increase in morbidity and possibly
mortality could have resulted. Use of contradictory terms and
protocols must be avoided in managing MCIs. It must also be clear
to everyone in the ﬁeld what the deﬁnition is of terms used in these
protocols. For example ‘walking wounded’ should not be explained
as ‘not injured’ or ‘not entitled to hospital evaluation.’
Trauma mechanism and spinal immobilisation
According to the ﬁeld triage rules by the American College of
Surgeons all casualties of a high energy impact should be
considered for evaluation in a major trauma centre rather than
a level II or III trauma centre, based on the expected severity of the
injuries.9 In everyday practice in the Netherlands, if expected
injuries are less severe, high energy trauma casualties can also be
transported to level II hospitals.15 The criteria of high energy
impact are deﬁned for more common trauma mechanisms like falls
from height or motor vehicle accidents, but not for rare accidents
like plane crashes.9 The one criterion most applicable for this plane
crash was ‘death in the same passenger compartment,’ being 6
people who were seated in the passenger compartment that did
not survive the impact of the crash. The decision that all casualties
should be evaluated in hospital on the basis of the high energy
trauma criteria was therefore justiﬁable.
In the TAC 75% of the casualties had no spinal immobilisation
during transport to hospital, and 22% of the casualties eventually
diagnosed with spinal injury were not transported with immo-
bilisation. The MIMMS states that ‘full spinal immobilisation is
impractical for all casualties of, for example, a rail crash, even
though they are exposed to the same mechanism of injury. Clinical
judgement must be exercised to a greater extent than in a single
casualty blunt trauma incident.’14 The trauma mechanism of this
plane crash has put several parts of the spinal column at risk for
injury. Ninety-two of the 126 survivors had a head or facial injury
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hitting the head itself against the planes’ interior, putting the
cervical spine at risk.33 The crash could have been assumed to have
been accompanied with horizontal and vertical deceleration
forces.18 This might have resulted in a blow to the thorax by
hitting the seat in front compressing the thorax and or ﬂailing over
the seatbelt compromising the lumbar spine in the horizontal
deceleration force. Considering a possible vertical deceleration, a
direct compression force is applied to the entire spine especially in
seating position. For decision making about cervical spine
immobilisation the NEXUS criteria are the basis of the Dutch
ambulance protocol.15 In this type of trauma the NEXUS criteria
seem to be incomplete. In the TAC availability of medical resources
like ambulances and immobilisation material was not sparse, so
more casualties could have been transported with spinal
immobilisation. In retrospective the Dutch ambulance protocol
appeared also to be insufﬁcient to clear the spine as a whole. The
mechanism of injury must be accompanied by symptoms like pain
in spine, not alert patient (GCS < 15 or intoxication), distracting
injury, neurological deﬁcit, facial (not head) injury or suspicion of
basilar skull fracture, in order for the ambulance personnel to
immobilise the spine.15 If the trauma mechanism would have been
considered at an earlier stage, emergency medical personnel at the
scene probably would have immobilised more casualties.
In summary the TAC was not a disaster, since there was enough
medical capacity to manage all casualties with high standards of
care. This is reﬂected in the critical mortality rate of 0%. But when a
crash like this happens the magnitude cannot fully be predicted in
the ﬁrst moments of pre-hospital care. Therefore it is the right
thing to start triaging as if it is a disaster where it is expected that
there will be a lack of capacity. This means ﬁrst (all) P1 casualties
should be identiﬁed by physiological parameters as with the Triage
Sieve. The rest, being P2 and P3 casualties can wait. Later when the
scale of the incident is clear and it can be assumed that there is
enough capacity that high standards of care can be delivered to
every casualty, the incident should be downgraded to a MCI where
normal triage and standards of care can be applied. This takes into
account not only physiological parameters and injury type, but also
mechanism of injury. In retrospective this was in general the actual
course of the management of the TAC.
Conclusion
After the Turkish Airlines Crash documentation of triage was
minimal. According to the Baxt criteria there was a high percentage
of overtriage (up to 89%), which can be desired in daily practice to
minimise undertriage, but is less desirable in MCIs and disasters.
Over- and undertriage did not result in an increase of mortality,
since the critical mortality rate was 0%. The possible injuries
sustained by the P3 casualties should not be underestimated, as
major injuries were diagnosed in this group. In an airplane
accident, such as described in this study, spinal immobilisation
should be considered for transport of all survivors.
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